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Abstract
I use evolutionary game theory to address the relation between nationalism and immigration,
studying how two different populations in a country, one composed of national citizens and the other
of immigrants, evolve over time. Both populations depart from some polymorphic initial state. A na-
tional citizen may behave either nationalistically or may welcome immigrants. Immigrants may have
an interest in learning the host country language or not. I also account for the presence of enclaves,
which make the immigrants’ own population effects important. The results show that six types of
evolutionary equilibria are possible, although they never co-exist in the state space. A low cost of
learning the host country language leads to complete assimilation of immigrants over time. Enclaves
make assimilation a less competitive strategy. A high cost of learning may lead to peaceful multicul-
turalism or to political instability depending on the ability of policy makers to prevent nationalistic
attitudes.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I analyze the long run effect on the behaviour of individuals resulting from a continuous
relationship between nationals and immigrants, with a focus on the case in which both nationalism
and cultural barriers co-exist. Nationalism and immigration have been very closely related issues
in Europe for the last decade. Nationalist parties have been growing in many countries across the
European Union (EU) with some of them already having obtained seats in the European Parliament.1
In the UK, the British National Party (BNP) has increasingly been present in the media and has
a strong anti-immigration policy. The main issue behind the BNP’s immigration policy is the fact
that about 3.7 million immigrants have entered the UK since 1997, the vast majority from non-EU
countries. The party also states that 20% of the current UK residents were either born overseas or
from foreign parents. According to the BNP, this strong immigration inflow is the main contributing
factor to the loss of what is referred to as British indigenous identity over the past decades and is
creating a population of “white Britons second-class citizens”.
To address the relation between nationalism and immigration, I study how two different pop-
ulations in a country, one composed of national citizens and the other of immigrants, evolve over
time given both depart from some polymorphic2 initial state and assuming that among the national
citizens some individuals behave in a nationalistic (chauvinist) way, while others simply welcome im-
migrants. The latter population has individuals who have an interest in becoming assimilated. They
make an effort to achieve this by learning the language of the host country (used in this paper as a
proxy for cultural assimilation), while other immigrants simply do not have this interest and do not
learn at all. Hence, the main objective is to understand how the presence of different levels of nation-
alism and assimilation, together with the existence of immigrants’ enclaves, affects the equilibrium
states of both populations. Depending on the interaction among these factors, we may end up with
monomorphic or polymorphic populations. I assume two cases: a first one in which immigrants live
dispersed across the country, making interactions within their own population insignificant. Later, I
extend this model to allow for the case in which a significant number of immigrants live in an enclave
and interactions among them are more likely to occur.
The use of language assimilation as a proxy for the acquisition of the host country’s culture by
immigrants is justified by the fact that language and religion have been the two most important cul-
tural infrastructures serving as bases for national differentiation and modern demands of autonomy
in Europe [Shafir (1995)].
The importance of investigating the influence of enclaves in the process of immigrants’ assimi-
1In the 2009 European Parliament (EP) election, the French Front National won 3 seats and the British National Party
got 2 seats. Other European nationalist political parties include the Italian Fiamma Tricolore (1 seat in the 2004 EP
election), the Spanish Democracia Nacional, the Portuguese Partido Nacional Renovador, among others.
2Polymorphism is simply heterogeneity. From the literature on Biology, polymorphism is related to the existence of
more than one phenotype, which are the organism’s observable properties or behaviours. One example with respect to
behaviour would be the hawk and the dove behaviours in the classical hawk-dove game and an example with respect to
phisical property would be the spotted and the melanistic (also known as black) jaguars.
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lation follows from the empirical literature on migration. Lazear (1999) found a negative correlation
between immigrants’ fluency in the host country language and concentration in his study for the US.
The same kind of behaviour was found by Chiswick and Miller (2001) using data from the 1991
Canadian census. In Toronto, where a concentration of Portuguese speakers exists, after 15 years
living in Canada, 35% of the latter are able to speak English or French and make use of the host
country language even at home. The same figure rises to 42% for the case of immigrants living in
Canadian areas where zero percent of the population speak the language of their country of origin.
In the framework I adopt, the country always keeps shares of nationals and immigrants over time.
What changes over time (over generations) is their attitude toward nationalistic ideas and learning,
respectively. Hence, I am interested in analyzing whether immigrants become assimilated or not,
without being concerned if they get fully incorporated into the national collective at all. Using the
terminology of Shafir (1995), incorporation into the host country is composed by two stages: assim-
ilation, which means cultural incorporation through language learning and marrying local spouses;
and integration, meaning immigrants are structurally incorporated into local economics, political and
other organizations. Only when the latter is achieved, an immigrant can be regarded as fully incor-
porated. I assume immigrants are able to either achieve cultural incorporation or no incorporation at
all. This is the main difference between learner and non-learner immigrants.
In his work, Shafir (1995) classifies three main immigrant-host relation frameworks: assimila-
tion, which is based on the expectation that immigrants are pushed out of agrarian origin regions
and pulled by modern host regions where, although they struggle to deal with a new culture and
generally live in bad conditions, they make an effort to achieve incorporation over time. At the other
extreme, segmentation views immigration just as part of the capitalist process in which host countries
seek for complementary labour force and immigrants are directed toward less economically advan-
tageous sectors, creating then permanent barriers for their social assimilation and integration. The
third framework is that of multiculturalism, which lies in between the former ones. Multiculturalism
in fact can have two distinct characteristics. On the one hand, as applied in countries such as Sweden,
UK and Australia, immigrants have the right and support to keep their language and culture if they
desire, under the expectation that at least their descendents will eventually become nationals or in-
corporated individuals. On the other hand, multiculturalism can be as perverse as segmentation, such
as in post-independent Latvia and Estonia, where there exists a tendency to treat Russian and Slavic
nationals as a permanent minority. With respect to nationalism, this can be a corporate one, which is
opposed to immigrants and their integration or a hegemonic one, which offers a window for the inte-
gration of immigrants. Although distinct, both emerge from fears of “denationalization” of the host
country culture. It is important to stress that nationalistic movements have a kind of erratic evolution
with many countries having shifted from corporate nationalism to a hegemonic one and vice-versa
over time. Other countries, especially in Western Europe, present what Shafir calls primordial na-
tionalism, which emerges due to the unbalanced modernization of all sectors of a country’s society.
The dissatisfaction of the sectors that benefit less from this modernization process is then translated
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into hostility towards the immigrants who are viewed as the symbol of this unbalacement.
In the model I present in section 2, nationalism is more related to the corporate or primordial
types.3 I take into account that some sort of nationalistic behaviour exists among some nationals, and
depending on the attitude of policy makers towards its prevention or not, this nationalism may spread
over time or even disappear, also depending on the interaction between nationals and immigrants. I
show that the result of such interaction leads to all possible three frameworks of immigrant-host
relations. The one that emerges depends, among other factors, on the effort immigrants have to make
to overcome the cultural barrier in the host country, while at the same time they may have to deal
with nationalistic behaviour.
With respect to the labour relations between hosts and immigrants, I adopt a simple assumption
in which nationals work in essential services, while immigrants work in non-essential activities. My
terminology essential services refers to well established sectors of the country’s economy or public
services which in many countries are restricted to national or naturalized immigrant employees. I do
not assume any further kind of labour market structure in the model or wage differentials. This is
justified not only for the sake of simplicity but also due to the mixed evidence presented in the em-
pirical labour economics literature. Borjas (1994) concluded that the literature so far did not provide
enough understanding about how immigrants’ inflows affect the natives in the host country labour
market. In his paper, he presents several examples in which both natives’ wages and employment
were not affected by a significant inflow of immigrants. One case in which there was an immigration
shock, occurred in France in 1962 after Algeria’s independence and the work by Hunt (1992) is often
cited in the literature. The massive inflow of 900 thousand people to France led to an increase of
1.9% in the French population and 1.6% in its labour force. This repatriation movement resulted
in an increase in unemployment of 0.3p.p. with little impact on the affected localities. An even
more challenging case of massive immigration took place a decade later in Portugal. According to
Carrington and Lima (1996), in 1975, one year after the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) took the
power in Portugal, thus ending the Salazar-Caetano regime period, there was a massive inflow of 600
thousand people from the former colonies to Portugal, especially from Angola and Mozambique.
Even in a country that by that time had a population of 9 million, the authors ended concluding that
overall there was no large adverse effect of immigration on the Portuguese labour market outcomes.
One possible problem with the above results, according to Borjas (1994), is that in general labour
markets are assumed as closed entities once immigration takes place. In reality, when a strong inflow
of immigrants occurs, natives may also emigrate and internal migration may also slow down towards
the areas receiving immigrants. As a counter example, Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) tried to
3In my model xenophobia is the feeling of hating the immigrants which affects the nationalists due to their fear of
denationalization of the host country culture. Their reaction to this hate/fear are their nationalistic attitudes against the
immigrants, translated into hostility in my model through a tentative of boycotting them. According to the Oxford and
the Cobuild English dictionaries, xenophobia “is a fear of people from other countries, or a strong dislike of them.” In
other words, xenophobia is the harm derived from having to face immigrants while nationalism is the reaction against
immigrants.
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analyze the macro impact of immigration and found that, between 1980 and 1988, a significant de-
cline in the wages of high school dropouts was a result of the inflow of a large number of low skilled
immigrants.
The main contribution of my paper is to employ evolutionary game theory (EGT) to study mi-
gration and its relation with nationalism, assimilation and the existence of enclaves. To my best
knowledge such a framework has not been developed yet. EGT has been used to study many other
problems such as the evolution of crime over time [Cressman, Morrison and Wen (1998)], the bank-
ing system and corporate governance in the particular case of post-socialist Lithuania [Marmefelt
(2004)] and the effect of economic agents’ behaviour on the long-run performance of the economy
[Carrera (2009)]. In the latter, depending on the initial conditions, a country ends up either in a low-
level (poverty trap) or high-level equilibrium. While Cressman, Morrison and Wen (1998) employ
the replicator dynamics with no own population effects to model the dynamic adjustment process,
Marmefelt (2004) includes own population effects in the replicator equations. Many other examples
of EGT models as well as different dynamic adjustment processes can be found and a paper with a
very interesting discussion on EGT is Friedman (1998).
In order to model the dynamic adjustment process of the behaviour of individuals over time in
my model, I employ the replicator dynamics, initially without own population effects. Later, I extend
the model to include them for the study of the effects of immigrants’ enclaves. In evolutionary games
employing replicator dynamics, agents from a single or multiple populations are randomly paired to
play a stage game. These pairwise contests repeat over time, where the time intervals are assumed
to be infinitesimal.4 Each agent is programmed to play a given pure strategy, depending on his
type.5 A strategy in my model is a behaviour, which can be to learn or not (to behave nationalistic or
not) for the case of the population of immigrants (nationals). The payoff an individual receives for
adopting a given behaviour depends not only on the stage game payoffs but also on the opponent’s
population state, that is, the proportions of individuals adopting the n possible opponent’s behaviours.
Strategies leading to payoffs above the own population average payoff increase their proportion of
adoption among the own population individuals over time. Strategies that do worse than average,
become extinct over time. Hence, replicator dynamics deals with the role of selection, similarly to
natural selection. Successful behaviours tend to proliferate over time among the population while
unsuccessful behaviours become extinct.6
My results show that when immigrants live dispersed among the host country population, an
4See Maynard Smith (1982) for a description of animal contests in a biological context of an evolutionary game. The
so-called Hawk-Dove game assumes a single population game in which two animals can behave in one of two ways
during a pairwise contest: either adopt the Hawk or Dove behaviour. The expected number of offspring of each animal
depends on both the adopted behaviour and on the distribution of behaviours among the population’s individuals. Payoffs
are dynamical over time.
5In every stage game, an individual plays a pure strategy against a completely mixed strategy which is the population
state, i.e., the population shares of individuals who are programmed to play each pure strategy available.
6Replicator dynamics deals poorly with mutation given that if one strategy is not represented in the system of ordinary
differential equations at time zero, no individual in the population will ever adopt it in the future [Gintis (2000)].
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equilibrium with complete cultural assimilation of the former group occurs only if the effort to learn
the host country culture is low. Although this pattern showed to be independent of whether the host
country adopts measures to prevent nationalism or not, there is indeed a difference in the pattern
of evolution depending on the ability of policy makers to prevent nationalistic attitudes. For the
case when the cost of learning is neither low nor high, while the adoption of policies to prevent
nationalism leads to evolution to a monomorphic state of both populations, free nationalism leads
both immigrants and nationals to evolve keeping a permanent polymorphic state. In the former,
immigrants do not learn and nationalists disappear over time while, in the latter, both populations
will oscillate over time with respect to the shares of each of their types. Also, when the cost of
learning the host country language is high, while official prevention of nationalism leads to peaceful
multiculturalism, free nationalism leads to an evolutionary equilibrium related to political instability
in the long run.
The introduction of immigrants’ enclaves in the model leads to two main effects: in line with the
empirical literature on migration, the existence of enclaves in the host country makes assimilation a
less competitive strategy. Depending on the size of the enclave and the extra utility it adds to non-
learners, an evolutionary equilibrium with full assimilation may not exist. The second impact of the
existence of enclaves is that, when nationalism is prevented, depending on the cost of learning, im-
migrants may evolve to a polyphormic state in equilibrium, while nationals become a monomorphic
population. On the other hand, when there are no measures to prevent nationalism, both populations
may evolve to an evolutionary equilibrium in which they continue to be polymorphic as at the initial
conditions, just with different shares of each of their two types of individuals. In any possible case
I studied, there are never multiple evolutionary equilibria. If this was the case, the evolution of the
two populations toward their equilibrium would be dependent on the initial conditions of the prob-
lem. Given in my model there is always one single equilibrium, the initial conditions only dictate the
lenght of time it will take both populations to evolve to the equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I set up and solve the model
for the two different cases with respect to the existence of enclaves, section 3 presents a numerical
simulation, section 4 gives directions for further research and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Countries without immigrants’ enclaves
I consider a country in which there are two very large distinct populations: national citizens and
immigrants. The latter group is composed of individuals who come from the same origin country.
Nationals work in essential services such as utilities services, hospitals, transport and general public
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services. Immigrants work performing other activities. I do not make any assumption with respect to
rationality in the sense that individuals do not need to be rational at all. Over time, individuals meet in
downtown in a pairwise meeting composed of one randomly selected individual of each population,
that is, an immigrant wishes to make use of an essential service and, hence, has to meet with a national
who is an employee there. During such a meeting, an individual from the population of national
citizens may behave either in a nationalistic way (pure strategy N - nationalist) or welcoming anyone
(strategy W - welcome). The immigrant may be an individual fluent in the host country language
(strategy L - learner) or may not have learned it (strategy H - non-learner).
Learner-type immigrants are able to have full access to any service, independently of the type of
employee they meet, and are able to interact with the place where they live when they travel from
their houses to downtown (in the sense of being able to read the newspapers, signs, advertisements
and have a full understanding of what is going on in the streets). They obtain an utility f1(P) and
f2(K) from the service and the interaction, respectively. On the other hand, they incur an effort (or
a cost) of learning the language f3(c),7 which depends on the language distance between the origin
and host countries official idioms ξ , with ∂ f3(c)∂ξ > 0. Every individual is equally gifted with respect
to language learning, so this effort to learn is the same for every immigrant. Non-learner-type im-
migrants do not incur this cost but also do not obtain any utility from interaction in the streets and,
whenever meeting with a nationalist-type employee, they are not able to have full access to the pub-
lic service obtaining an utility α f1(P), α 2 [0;1). The parameter α , controlled by the government,
measures the ability nationalists have to boycott immigrants when dealing with them. In the extreme
case of complete boycott, non-learners are fully prevented from getting any service, α = 0. Such
boycotts are very likely when there is no legal mechanism in the host country to avoid them or, even
worse, when such boycotts are officialized by the host country constitution. Independently of the
nationalists’ degree of xenophobia, policies to reduce or eliminate this kind of barrier in the access to
the services may exist, such as the availability of forms in different languages as well as information
about the citizens’ rights at the public services offices. Both types of immigrants face a disutility
f4(∆) due to feeling discriminated whenever they meet with a nationalist-type. In this paper, dis-
crimination is a result of feeling rejected by someone, which can arise independently of being able
to access the services or not. Therefore, the possible payoffs for an immigrant, resulting from the
pairwise meeting between national and immigrant individuals, measured in terms of utility, are:8
um(N;L) = f (P;K)  f (c;∆)
um(N;H) = α f1(P)  f4(∆)
7More precisely, f3(c) is the cost of learning per pairwise meeting.
8The shape of the utility functions does not affect the dynamics of the system. What really matters is that all the
utility functions are assumed as non-negative, increasing and starting from the origin (0;0). They can be either concave
or convex and what affects the selection mechanism in the replicator dynamics equations are the net payoffs in the stage
game matrix because different values and signs in the elements of the payoff matrix lead to different coefficients in the
ordinary differential equations and, hence, different possible evolutionary equilibria and patterns of stability.
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um(W;L) = f (P;K)  f3(c)
um(W;H) = f1(P)
where fi() 2ℜ+; fi(0) = 0; f 0i () > 0; f 00i () < 0_ f 00i () > 0 and f (x;y) = fi(x)+ f j(y). From
the above payoffs, um(W;L) > um(N;L) and um(W;H) > um(N;H) always hold, that is, following
the logic, immigrants always prefer to meet a welcome-type national independently of their type.
Nationalists, on the other hand, face a trade-off due to the combination of the degree of xeno-
phobia X they feel and their capacity to boycott immigrants. While their sentiment of xenophobia
brings them a disutility f5(X) caused by being forced to interact with immigrants at their workplace,
understood as a “hate for aliens”, on the other hand they also obtain some pleasure when they are able
to restrict the immigrants’ access to essential services. This pleasure gives them utility (1 α) f1(P),
which is exactly the utility level they are able to extract from non-learners when the latter have par-
tial access to the services they request. Overall, nationalists have positive utility levels whenever the
amount of harm they are able to inflict on immigrants more than offsets the burden of having to face
them.9 Welcome-type nationals are indifferent between dealing with learners or non-learners and
they do not earn or loose any utility from interacting with immigrants. Hence, the possible payoffs
for a national are:10
un(N;L) =  f5(X)
un(N;H) = (1 α) f1(P)  f5(X)
un(W;L) = 0
un(W;H) = 0
9The level of utility nationalists obtain from harming the non-learner-type immigrants, (1 α) f1(P), depends on two
aspects: the first aspect is the utility immigrants get from fully using the public services, f1(P). The higher this utility is,
the greater the pleasure a nationalist obtains if she is able to boycott a non-learner making the public service she wishes
to use unavailable. The second aspect is the parameter α . This parameter depends on exogenous policies set by the
government to try to enforce the accessibility of the public services to everyone. The higher this parameter is, the greater
the accessibility of non-learners to the public services is, making the boycott carried by the nationalists less successfull
and, hence, bringing the latter less utility from harming the immigrants.
10In reality, the nationals also obtain some utility from the use of the public services. Assuming their utility is given by
a function g(P), which would be the same for both nationalist and welcome-type nationals, a national individual would
get this utility in a pairwise meeting with another national, i.e., a meeting between a national wishing to use the public
service and another national who worked there. Hence, this process would be an own-population effect for the population
of nationals and their payoff matrix would be given by:
 N W
N g(P);0 g(P);0
W g(P);0 g(P);0

where the row player is the one seeking for the service and the column one is the employee providing it. In the replicator
dynamics, this kind of own-population effect would have no impact on the selection mechanism over time given that the
payoff from any strategy (nationalist or welcome) would equal the nationals’ population average payoff, i.e., u(e1;x) 
u(x;x) = u(e2;x)  u(x;x) = g(P)[p+ (1  p)]  g(P)[p2 + 2p(1  p) + (1  p)2] = 0. Therefore, I do not take into
account the own-population effect of the nationals in the model, derived from their own use of the public services, but
one should have in mind that the existence of the public services in the host country brings positive utility not only for
the immigrants but also for the nationals.
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The dynamics governing the model is the standard replicator dynamics [Weibull (1997)], also
known as Malthusian dynamics [Friedman (1998)]. Since local shifts in the payoff functions do not
affect the standard replicator dynamics, I make a transformation in the payoff matrices of immigrants
(M) and nationals (N) following Friedman (1998), in which all elements of the main diagonal be-
come zero. For an alternative transformation in which the off-main diagonal elements become zero
instead, see Weibull (1997). Hence, using i1 = i12  i22 and i2 = i21  i11, (i = n;m):
M =
 
0 m1
m2 0
!
N =
 
0 n1
n2 0
!
In order to make this set up clear, I should emphasize that m12 is the payoff a learner gets when
facing a welcome-type national, while n12 is the payoff a nationalist obtains when confronted with a
non-learner-type immigrant, such that merging both matrices M and N above, we end up with:
 L H
N 0;0 n1;m2
W n2;m1 0;0
!
To make the notation easier, from now on I will simply call f () any utility function fi(). Assum-
ing p is the proportion of nationalists among the population of nationals while q is the proportion of
learners among the population of immigrants, assuming x (y) is equivalent of having a player in the
population of nationals (immigrants) playing a strategy in the interior of the corresponding simplex
∆i; i = n(i = m), from matrices M and N, the population states sn = (p;1  p) and sm = (q;1 q) are
governed over time, respectively, by:
p˙ = (u(e1;y) u(x;y))p = (n1(1 q) n1(1 q)p n2(1  p)q)p
) p˙ = (n1(1 q) n2q)p(1  p) (1)
and
q˙ = (u(x;e1) u(x;y))q = (m1(1  p) m1(1  p)q m2(1 q)p)q
9
) q˙ = (m1(1  p) m2 p)q(1 q) (2)
The game overall state space is therefore the square θ = sn sm = [0;1]2 ℜ2 and, for the sake
of simplicity, I will represent a given state as (p;q). Substituting n1, n2, m1 and m2 in eqs. (1) and
(2) for the payoffs:11
p˙ = (((1 α) f (P)  f (X))(1 q)  f (X)q)p(1  p) (3)
and
q˙ = (( f (K)  f (c))(1  p)  ( f (c)  (1 α) f (P)  f (K))p)q(1 q) (4)
From eqs. (3-4), we may have the following cases:
(1 α) f (P)> f (X)) n1 > 0;n2 > 0 (5)
(1 α) f (P)< f (X)) n1 < 0;n2 > 0 (6)
11In appendix I, I present a detailed derivation of both equations (1) and (2). According to Friedman (1998), evo-
lutionary games are a natural approach in Biology given the fitness of a biological trait or behaviour depends both on
the prevalence of that behaviour in the current population and on the prevalence of alternative behaviours. He gives
an example of an aggressive animal having a higher fitness when that behaviour is rare among the population. In such
case, the chance of facing a conteraggression would be rare. Hence, while the behaviour was relatively rare, the genetic
transmission of the aggressive behaviour in the population over time would be very successful. Friedman states that,
although genetic transmission may sometimes face constraints when applied in economic problems, models adopting
EGT are useful whenever the outcome of an agent interacting with other agents depends on the others’ behaviour and on
the agent’s behaviour. In my model each population has only two possible behaviours. Looking at equation (1) for the
case of nationals, one can see that whenever u(e1;y)< u(x;y), i.e., whenever the adoption of the nationalistic behaviour
does worse than average when dealing with a polymorphic population of immigrants (hence contesting against a mixed
strategy y), the proportion of nationalists decreases over time. Even if one assumes that individuals are “wired” to always
play the same pure strategy over life as in many games in Biology, the natural selection mechanism behind the replicator
dynamics here can be understood in the sense that, at early stages of human life, a recently born individual has not her
personnality fully defined yet. At the same time, she is exposed to the behaviours which are present in the environment
(home, school, etc...). Hence in the early stage of life, during the learning process, one will be exposed to nationalistic
and welcome type influences until making her final decision with respect to her personnality. If to behave nationalis-
tically leads more often to a lower payoff than to welcome immigrants, it is more likely through natural selection that
over time, the proportion of nationalists will decrease because less young nationals will adopt (‘be wired to’) a nation-
alistic personnality. Once the personnality is defined, one does not change it anymore over life. Also in countries with
a very large population of welcome types, to show a nationalistic trait would be more discouraged. With respect to the
immigrants, the reasoning behind equation (2) is the same, i.e., whenever u(x;e1) < u(x;y), the proportion of learners
decreases over time. With respect to immigrants, immigration decision depends on information people receive about a
place. If to be a non-learner pays-off, in the long run more people with a non-learner behaviour will be attracted by the
host country than people with a learner-type behaviour. Or alternatively, in the long run more new immigrants will tend
to keep their own culture after their arrival instead of learning the host country culture.
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f (c) 2 [0; f (K)  ε]) m1 > 0;m2 < 0 (7)
f (c) 2 [ f (K)+ ε; f (K)+(1 α) f (P)  ε]) m1 < 0;m2 < 0 (8)
f (c) 2 [ f (K)+(1 α) f (P)+ ε;+∞)) m1 < 0;m2 > 0 (9)
where ε ! 0. Equation (5) refers to a country where nationalist behaviour is not prevented by
the government (α is low) and individuals supporting movements against immigrants are able to
create barriers making the life of non-assimilated immigrants in the host country difficult given that
they are not able to benefit fully from the use of essential services. Someone may argue that it
could also be the case that xenophobia was very low and, actually, every immigrant could access any
service (that is, X very close to zero and α high, even close to 1) but this would be a less interesting
case and, given the paper focus on nationalism, I shall assume xenophobia by nationalists does exist
and is relevant, in line with the former possibility. Equation (6) refers to the opposite situation, in
which xenophobia exists and is strong among the proportion of the nationals adopting nationalistic
behaviour but there is some institutional policy giving enough protection for the access of any kind
of individual to any service (α is high). This latter scenario is similar to the cases of Catalonia and
Basque country in Spain with respect to the inflow of Castilians. Also recent examples are those of
Latvia and Estonia during the USSR era, in which such countries had a welfare level above the other
former soviet republics, attracting immigrants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Such immigration
was not well received creating a strong level of nationalism in these countries but at the same time,
both immigration and the access of immigrants to institutions and the labour market could not be
prevented by nationalistic attitudes given these regions played a limited role in Moscow’s central
political institutions [see Shafir (1995)].
With respect to the effort of learning, f (c) may fall in one of 3 intervals which I will call low,
intermediate and high cost of learning. Eq. (7) refers to a situation in which both host and origin
countries share the same or a very closely related language (eg: Argentina and Brazil). In this case,
the cost of language acquisition is low. The other extreme is given in eq. (9), in which immigrants
have a very different cultural background when compared to the nationals of the host country and
language acquisition is very costly. I now analyze the six possible combinations when immigrants
do not live in enclaves. In all cases, I always depart from an initial condition according to which both
populations of nationals and immigrants living in the coutry are polymorphic.
Proposition 1: The game state space θ contains at most five stationary states, θ 0, all them may
be Nash equilibria, θNE , but only four of them may be evolutionary stable states (ESS), θESS, and
evolutionary equilibria (EE), θEE .
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Proof: Equations 3 and 4 lead to the following fixed points: (0;0); (1;0); (0;1); (1;1) and
(p = f (c)  f (k)(1 α) f (P) , q =
(1 α) f (P)  f (X)
(1 α) f (P) ), the latter when f (c) 2 [ f (K)+ ε; f (K)+(1 α) f (P)  ε] and
(1 α) f (P)> f (X). The former four ones are Nash equilibria when at least one of the populations
has a dominant strategy. The latter is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which is a Liapunov
stable state under replicator dynamics with no own population effects but not assymptotically stable
(and, hence, not EE). The rest of the proof comes from the fact that every strict Nash equilibrium
is evolutionary stable and when the dynamics of the population states is governed by replicator
dynamics, every ESS is also an EE
2.1.1 Host countries with weak or no anti-nationalist laws
In this section I analyze all possibilities when immigrants move to a country in which nationalistic
movements do exist and the central government does not implement enough measures to prevent it.
Proposition 2: When the cost of learning the host country language is low and there is no
prevention against nationalism, over time both populations become monomorphic with all nationals
welcoming immigrants and the latter becoming completely assimilated.
Proof: In this case, ni > 0; m1 > 0; m2 < 0; hence, q˙ > 0 and in the long run non-learner-types
disappear from the immigrants’ population.12 To learn is a dominant strategy for the population
of immigrants. The best response for the population of nationals is to become welcome-types and
nationalism also disappears in the long run. Hence, over time, non-learners and nationalists decrease
their share in their respective populations until becoming extinct and in the limit both populations
become monomorphic. θNE = θESS = θEE = (0;1)
This is the context in host countries where language distance is very small. Countries which lan-
guages are close tend to share the same norms and values, which is a facilitator or even an incentive
to attract immigrants who end up learning the language once they start to live in the host society. On
the side of the nationals, nationalistic behaviour does not pay over time given the proximity between
the cultures of both origin and host countries, which makes it possible, independently of the level
of xenophobia and nationalistic boycott against immigrants, for any individual to have access to the
services because they all become learners. In other words, given assimilation takes place over time,
calls for nationalistic behaviour among the nationals population lose strength in the long run and
nationalistic attitudes become extinct.
Proposition 3: In countries with very high costs of learning the language and where no preven-
tion against nationalism exists, populations of nationals and immigrants evolve to a monomorphic
state in which immigrants are not assimilated and nationals behave nationalistically. In this case,
multiculturalism is an equilibrium which may de-stabilyze the country politically in the long run.
Proof: We have the opposite from proposition 2, with m1 < 0; m2 > 0; q˙ < 0. The dominant
12In appendix I, I present an alternative analytical proof of propositions 2-5, based on the linearization of the non-linear
system of ordinary differential equations composed of equations (1) and (2) at the stationary points.
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strategy for the population of immigrants now is not to learn the language while nationals best re-
spond raising nationalistic behaviour. θNE = θESS = θEE = (1;0), which is located at the southeast
corner of the square [0;1]2

In fact, such kind of multiculturalism is not the one implemented in countries such as the UK,
Sweden, Canada and Australia, which tend to welcome immigrants. This is more likely a kind of
forced multiculturalism implemented on the nationals (indigenous population) by an outside power,
similar to the metropolitan policies in the former colonies during the past. The incapacity to achieve
self determination in Africa and Asia, together with the association of the indigenous culture to sec-
ond class citizens, such that Europeans did not want to learn it, led to strong nationalistic movements
which over time evolved to guerrila, civil war and a massive outflow of the European population
from the former African colonies after independence. In the more recent history, situations similar
to these ones happened in regions such as Latvia and Estonia. According to Shafir (1995), linguistic
assimilation is particularly encouraged when the host region language is the language of a prosperous
country. In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, immigrants from the former USSR had not this under-
tanding given supremacy in terms of language was always associated to Moscow. Shafir (1995) adds
stating that, when after several generations, the indigenous population still considers the political
authority exercised over it as illegitimate and as a result only due to the anexation of their territory,
an empire overcomes the concept of state. In this kind of multicultural context where, in fact, the
immigrants are backed by the central power of the empire and do not see themselves as minorities,
in the long run, political stability may be a critical factor.
In the Baltic republics of the former USSR, two paralell societies emerged, one native, the other
an alien one, both of them with their own elites, which created a difficult barrier for integration. In
1985, only 52.6% of the population of Latvia had Latvian origin. The corresponding figure in Estonia
was 63.1%. These figures become more dramatic to the host populations if we consider the fact that
the populations of Latvia and Estonia at that time were 2.6 and 1.5 million, respectively, demasiated
small compared to the size of the former USSR.
Proposition 4: In countries where the cost of learning is neither low nor high and nationalism can
not be prevented, a fully polymorphic country will always hold over time, in which the proportions
of nationalists and learners will oscilate over generations.
Proof: This case is similar to the Buyer-Seller game of Friedman (1991) which was later used
by Cressman, Morrison and Wen (1998) in their model to study the dynamics of crime. We have
a dynamics similar to the predator-prey model of Lotka-Volterra in which both species of animals
compete against each other but not against themselves (no-overcrowding). In the country case, we
have θNE = (p;q); θNE
T
θESS = /0 and an evolutionary equilibrium does not exist. In the interior of
the square [0;1]2 we have closed orbits which spiral around the Nash equilibrium counter clockwise
If we assume an initial state in which welcome and non-leaner types are numerous within their
populations, eg. (0:1;0:1), nationalism starts to rise among the nationals population, achieves a very
high proportion rising at the same time the incentives to favour assimilated immigrants. When the
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proportion of nationalists starts to outnumber that of welcome-types, the proportion of non-learners
starts to decrease dramatically in the population of immigrants. This pattern in the immigrants pop-
ulation acts over time on the nationals population reducing the incentives for nationalistic behaviour.
Welcome types start to outnumber the proportion of nationalists and as a consequence, over time,
the proportion of non-learners grows. The cycle then re-starts. This evolutionary pattern is presented
in figure 4. An important piece of information is that the Nash equilibrium represents the average
behaviour of the populations over a long interval of time [Cressman, Morrison and Wen (1998)].
2.1.2 Host countries implementing anti-nationalist laws
In this section, I analyze the cases in which the government enforces policies to prevent nationalistic
behaviour in the essential services.
Proposition 5: In countries where there are official measures to prevent nationalistic behaviour,
unless the cost of learning is low, over time immigrants will not become culturally assimilated while
nationalism disappears.
Proof: We have n1 < 0; n2 > 0; p˙ < 0. The dominant strategy for the population of nationals
is to welcome immigrants while the latter best respond not learning the host country culture unless
f (c)< f (K). θNE = θESS = θEE = (0;0) for f (c)> f (K), which is located at the southwest corner
of the square [0;1]2 and θNE = θESS = θEE = (0;1) for f (c)< f (K)
Thus, comparing propositions 2, 3 and 5, we can see that complete assimilation or not inde-
pends of the policy adopted by the government with respect to nationalism prevention and is more
related to the degree of cultural distance. But, on the other hand, the pattern of multiculturalism a
country develops over time is closely related to the way policy makers deal with nationalism. The
multiculturalism pattern found in proposition 5 under θEE = (0;0) is very different from the one of
proposition 3 and the former matches with policies found in countries like the UK, Canada, Australia
and Sweden.
2.2 Effect of immigrants’ enclaves
In this section, I introduce the effect of the existence of enclaves of immigrants in the host country.
In this case, immigrants are more likely to interact among themselves and the evolution pattern for
their population depends not only on the evolution of the population of nationals but also on the
so called own population effects in the EGT literature. Similar to the analysis of own population
effects in Marmefelt (2004), I assume when enclaves exist the immigrants population interact with
the population of nationals with probability 1 and with their own population with probability ρ .
When ρ = 0, we fall back to the case without enclaves.
With respect to the payoffs immigrants get from the own population effect, I assume that the
benefit from this interaction accrues basically to the non-learner-type immigrants. A straightfoward
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example of the kind of gain the non-learner-types obtain from this interaction is the increased ability
to acquire new information about the host country. This becomes possible only when they network
with their own people due to their lack of knowledge of the host country language. The acquisition
of information about the “new” society in which they are inserted is higher when they meet with a
learner than when they meet another non-learner. On the other hand, learners benefit residually from
this own population effect due to the fact that they are perfectly able to acquire all information by
themselves.
Based on these assumptions the matrix M0 corresponding to the own population effect for the
immigrants is given by:
M0 =
 
0 m01
m02 0
!
where m01 = m
0
12 m
0
22, m
0
2 = m
0
21 m
0
11 and:
m011 = u
m(L;L) = 0
m012 = u
m(L;H) = 0
m021 = u
m(H;L) = β  f (K)
m022 = u
m(H;H) = γ  f (K)
with 1 > β > γ > 0 and f (K) is the utility learners obtain from their perfect ability to interact
with the environment.
The dynamics governing both population states is now given by equation (3) and by:13
q˙ = (u(x;e1) u(x;y)+ρ(u(y;e1) u(y;y)))q
q˙ = (m1(1  p) m2 p+ρm01(1 q) ρm
0
2q)(1 q)q (10)
q˙ = (( f (K)  f (c))(1  p) ( f (c) (1 α) f (P)  f (K))p ρ f (K)(γ(1 q)+βq))q(1 q) (11)
13The population of nationals continues to have no own population effect, hence eq.(3) is not affected by the existence
of enclaves.
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The analysis of the non-linear system of ODE now is not as straightforward as in section 2.1. I
will address it using the technique of linearization of the system at the critical points. In the case of a
non-hyperbolic14 system, I employ a Liapunov function to identify the stability of the critical point.
Rewriting eqs. (1) and (10) as:
p˙ = F1(p;q)
q˙ = F2(p;q)
The Jacobian matrix of the system at a given critical point (p;q) is given by:
Ω(p;q) =
0
@ ∂F1(p;q)∂ p ∂F1(p;q)∂q
∂F2(p;q)
∂ p
∂F2(p;q)
∂q
1
A
where:
∂F1(p;q)
∂ p = (n1(1 q) n2q)(1 2p)
∂F1(p;q)
∂q = (p  p
2)(n1 +n2)
∂F2(p;q)
∂ p = (q q
2)(m1 +m2)
∂F2(p;q)
∂q = (1 2q)(m1(1  p) m2 p+ρm
0
1(1 q) ρm
0
2q)  (q q
2)ρ(m01 +m
0
2)
The new non-linear system has seven possible stationary points which are candidates for an evolu-
tionary equilibrium. These points are (0;0), (0;1), (1;0), (1;1), as before, and (p1 =
f (c)  f (k)(1 γρ(1 q1) ρβq1)
(1 α) f (P) ,
q1 =
(1 α) f (P)  f (X)
(1 α) f (P) ), the latter when f (c) 2 [ f (K)(1  γρ(1  q1)  ρβq1)+ ε; f (K)(1  γρ(1 
q1) ρβq1)+(1 α) f (P)  ε] and (1 α) f (P)> f (X); (p2 = 0, q2 =
f (K)(1 ργ)  f (c)
ρ f (K)(β γ) ), the latter
when f (c) 2 [ f (K)(1 βρ)+ ε; f (K)(1  γρ)  ε]; (p3 = 1, q3 =
f (K)(1 ργ)+(1 α) f (P)  f (c)
ρ f (K)(β γ) ), the
latter when f (c) 2 [ f (K)(1 βρ)+(1 α) f (P)+ ε; f (K)(1  γρ)+(1 α) f (P)  ε].
Proposition 6: As in the case where enclaves do not exist, a stationary state θ 0 = (1;1), in
which all nationals behave nationalisticaly and all immigrants are learners is never an evolutionary
equilibrium.
Proof: At θ 0 = (1;1), the trace of the Jacobian, tr(Ω), is n2 +m2 + ρm02 and its determinant,
det(Ω), is n2(m2 +ρm02), where n2 is always positive. Hence, if det(Ω) > 0) tr(Ω) > 0 and both
14A dynamical system is hyperbolic at a fixed point x if every eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix has nonzero real part
[Gintis (2000)].
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distinct eigenvalues are positive leading to an unstable node. On the other hand, if det(Ω)< 0 then we
have two real distinct eigenvalues,15 one positive and the other negative, for which the corresponding
critical point is a saddle point
Proposition 7: When the immigrants community is very large making interaction among them-
selves very likely and the gain for non-learner immigrants from networking is very high, β! 1^ρ!
1, an evolutionary equilibrium involving complete assimilation of immigrants never exists.
Proof: As before, when the cost of learning is very low, f (c) 2 [0; f (k)(1 ρβ )  ε], indepen-
dently of the existence or not of laws against nationalistic behaviour, immigrants become assimi-
lated and nationalism disappears over time, that is, θEE = (0;1). At this critical point, tr(Ω) =
 n2  (m1 ρm02) and det(Ω) = n2(m1 ρm
0
2). Given n2 > 0, det(Ω)> 0 only if (m1 ρm
0
2)> 0,
implying also tr(Ω) < 0. Hence, we have a stable node and an evolutionary equilibrium whenever
f (c)< S = f (k)(1 ρβ ). On the other hand, when β ! 1^ρ! 1, S! 0 and complete assimilation
is not possible
Note that when S > 0 and complete assimilation is possible, the interval for f (c) is now narrower
than when there was no enclave (see proposition 2) and is in line with the empirical literature on
migration. The effect of an enclave of immigrants is to make assimilation a less competitive strat-
egy. Only individuals with very low switching language costs find profitable to become assimilated
[Lazear (1999)].
2.2.1 Host countries implementing anti-nationalist laws
In this section, I analyze the specific equilibria for the case when enclaves exist and nationalism is
prevented. When nationalism is prevented, the point (p1;q1) is never a stationary point, given it
requires (1 α) f (P) > f (X). For this case, we always have a minimum of four stationary points
(the corners of the square) and a maximum of six stationary points (the corners plus (p2;q2) and
(p3;q3)). The latter happens when f (K) >
(1 α) f (P)
ρ(β γ) ^ (1 α) f (P) > 0, in which case f (K)(1 
βρ)+(1 α) f (P) 2 [ f (K)(1 βρ)+ ε; f (K)(1  γρ)  ε].
Proposition 8: In countries where enclaves exist and there are enough official measures to pre-
vent nationalistic behaviour, as before, when the cost of learning is not low enough, over time immi-
grants will not become completely culturally assimilated while nationalism disappears. But now, it
may be possible to have an equilibrium in which the population of immigrants is polymorphic, with
part of them still learning the language.
Proof: Putting propositions 7 and 8 together, we have:
[Table 1 - see Appendix III]
15For critical points at which the off-main diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix are all zero, (tr(Ω))2  4det(Ω)
and the eigenvalues are necessarily real numbers. Hence, stability only requires tr(Ω)< 0^det(Ω)> 0.
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Case A was already proven in Proposition 7. To proof case B, at (0;q2), tr(Ω) = n1(1  q2) 
n2q2  (q2 q22)ρ(m01 +m
0
2)< 0, given n1 < 0 for the nationalism-prevented case and n2 > 0. Also
det(Ω) = [n1(1 q2) n2q2][(q2 q22)ρ(m01 +m
0
2)]> 0. Hence, (0;q2) is a stable node. For case
C, at (0;0), det(Ω) = n1(m1 + ρm01) and tr(Ω) = n1 +m1 + ρm
0
1. For stability, we require (1 
α) f (P)< f (X), that is, nationalism prevention and f (c)> f (K)(1 ργ), i.e., the cost of learning is
not low enough. To complete the proof, I show that when (1;q3) is a stationary point, it is always a
saddle point and that the corner (1;0) is not stable. At the former, det(Ω) = [n1(1 q3) n2q3][(q3 
q32)ρ(m01+m
0
2)]< 0. At the latter, det(Ω)= n1(m2 ρm
0
1) and tr(Ω)= n1 (m2 ρm
0
1), requiring
n1 > 0) free nationalism for stability
Hence, I summarize in the following table all the possible cases we may have with respect to
equilibria and stationary points for the case of enclaves together with nationalism prevention:
[Table 2 - see Appendix III]
In section 3.2, I present a numerical example for the case when all six stationary points are
present. Comparing propositions 5, 7 and 8, the existence of enclaves has two impacts. The first,
as stated before, is that it reduces the cost boundary for which an immigrant is indifferent between
learning or not the host country language. The second impact of the enclave is the existence of a
set of learning cost values for which polymorphism is an equilibrium and part of the population of
immigrants learns while the other part does not. The width of this interval, as well as the minimum
learning cost below which all immigrants become assimilated over time, depends on the enclaves’
importance, ρ , and on the parameters β and γ , that is, the interaction gain non-learner types get when
they live in enclaves. If enclaves are very large as well as the utility gain non-learner-types obtain,
then the multiculturalism pattern found in proposition 5 holds independently of the cost of learning
and, after some generations, no immigrant becomes assimilated at all:
ρ ! 1;β ! 1;γ ! 1^ f (k)(1 ργ)! f (k)(1 ρβ )! 0
Deepening the discussion a bit further with respect to the results of this section and those of
section 2.1.2 (nationalism prevented and no enclaves), when enclaves exist, to have no assimilation
at all requires a lower cost/effort of learning than before. Without enclaves this required f (c)> f (K)
while now it requires a lower cost, f (c)> f (K)(1 ργ). On the other extreme, with the existence of
enclaves, to have complete assimilation of immigrants over generations requires an even lower cost
of learning than before. Without enclaves, complete assimilation required f (c) < f (K) while now
it requires f (c) < f (K)(1 ρβ ) < f (K)(1 ργ) < f (K). For f (K)(1 ρβ ) < f (c) < f (K)(1 
ργ), there exists a set of values for the cost of learning leading to a transition state, i.e., a state in
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which some immigrants learn while others do not (polymorphism). Because now immigrants live
in enclaves, non-learners can benefit from interacting with other immigrants, especially learners, in
order to get information about the host country. Without enclaves, polymorphism could not be an
equilibrium because non-learner immigrants could not benefit from such interaction. Immigrants
then had an one-shot decision over generations, either complete assimilation or no assimilation at
all. This one-shot decision was naturally selected through the evolutionary mechanism behind the
replicator dynamics.
Based on the above discussion, starting from f (c) = f (K) and decreasing the cost of learn-
ing, without enclaves, all non-learner immigrants would disappear over generations because the be-
haviour of becoming a learner would be naturally selected given the extra utility f (K), only obtained
by learners, more than offsets the cost of learning f (c). With enclaves, things change. In order to
have some assimilation, the natural selection mechanism behind the replicator dynamics equations
requires a lower cost of learning. Also, if this cost of learning is below f (K)(1 ργ) but still above
f (K)(1  ρβ ), natural selection does not lead to complete assimilation over time. Some individ-
uals in the population of immigrants will end up learning given the extra utility f (K) more than
offsets the incurred cost of learning f (c). On the other hand, natural selection will allow for the
co-existence of non-learners which do not face the cost f (c) but still get an extra expected utility
ρ f (K) [βq+ γ(1 q)] (lower than f (K)), due to the existence of the enclave.
2.2.2 Free nationalism
Now, I analyze the context in which nationalism is not officialy prevented and enclaves exist in the
host country. When this is the case, depending on the cost of learning, the game state space θ = [0;1]2
has a minimum of four (the corners of the square) and a maximum of seven stationary states. These
points are the same as in the last section plus the point (p1;q1). Depending on the values of the
parameters, and depending on the value of the cost of learning, there are five possible cases with
respect to the presence or not of the stationary points in the model. These five cases are displayed in
the figure below:
[Figure 1 - see Appendix III]
Proposition 9: As in all cases presented so far, when nationalism is not prevented and enclaves
exist, multiple stationary points can co-exist in the state space but they are never simultaneous evo-
lutionary equilibria, i.e., the state space has at most one evolutionary equilibrium. Also, depending
on the cost of learning, an evolutionary equilibrium in which both populations continue to be poly-
morphic may exist.
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Proof: From the proof of proposition 7, for f (c)2 [0; f (K)(1 ρβ ) ε], θEE = (0;1). From the
proof of proposition 8, for the corner (1;0), all stability requires is free nationalism and f (c)> (1 
α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ). When the point (p1;q1) is stationary, we have tr(Ω) = (m01 +m
0
2)ρ(q1 
q12), which is always negative. Also, det(Ω) = (p1  p12)(q1 q12)(m1 +m2)(n1 +n2), which is
always positive. Also, for the specific case of this stationary point, we have [tr(Ω)]2 4det(Ω)< 0
and the stationary point is a stable focus. Hence, for any range of the cost of learning for which
(p1;q1) is a stationary point, it is indeed an evolutionary equilibrium in which both populations con-
tinue to be polymorphic. When (p2;q2) is a stationary point, we have at this point tr(Ω) = [n1(1 
q2) n2q2]  [(q2 q22)ρ(m01 +m
0
2)] and det(Ω) = [n1(1 q2) n2q2][(q2 q2
2)ρ(m01 +m
0
2)]. In
order to have tr(Ω) < 0 and det(Ω) > 0, we need f (c) < f (K)(1  ργ(1  q1)  ρβq1). Hence,
whenever the point (p2;q2) is a stationary point, it is an evolutionary equilibrium for all ranges
of the cost of learning from f (c) = f (K)(1  ρβ ) up to the inferior boundary of f (c) for which
the point (p1;q1) starts to become stationary. Whenever (p3;q3) is a stationary point, we have
tr(Ω) =  [n1(1  q3)  n2q3]  [(q3   q32)ρ(m01 + m
0
2)] and det(Ω) = [n1(1  q3)  n2q3][(q3  
q32)ρ(m01+m
0
2)]. For being a stable critical point and, hence, an evolutionary equilibrium, we require
f (c) > (1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ(1  q1) ρβq1). Hence, this point is an evolutionary equilib-
rium for all ranges of the cost of learning from the upper boundary for which the point (p1;q1) is a
stationary point up to the upper boundary for which the point (p3;q3) is a stationary point
Summarizing the results of the above proposition:
[Table 3 - see Appendix III]
In section 2.2.1, when nationalism was prevented and enclaves existed, independently of the
value of the cost of learning f (c), there was the possibility of ending up with no assimilation at all
over generations when ρ ! 1, β ! 1, γ ! 1. When nationalism is not prevented, from table 3, it
can be seen that this possibility can not hold anymore and, independently of ρ , β and γ , there exists
a range of values for f (c)> 0 such that some assimilation will hold in the evolutionary equilibrium.
For example, the evolutionary equilibrium (p1;q1) holds for some f (c) < (1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 
ργ(1 q1) ρβq1) and, therefore, 9 f (c)> 0 leading to this evolutionary equilibrium even if ρ! 1,
β ! 1 and γ ! 1, given that (1 α) f (P)> 0.
Also, comparing the results found in section 2.2.1 and in this section, the main difference is
that, when nationalism is not prevented, both populations can end-up in a polymorphic state. So,
for an intermediate level of the cost of learning the host country language, in a country where the
population of immigrants departs from an initial state containing both learners and non-learners and
the population of nationals have both nationalists and welcome-type individuals, none of the types
will become extinct over generations. The populations will reach an equilibrium in which all types
20
continue to coexist. Also, as when enclaves did not exist, when the cost of learning is high enough,
multiculturalism, θEE = (1;0), is an equilibrium which may de-stabilyze the country politically.
3 Numerical simulation
3.1 No enclaves
In this section, I present a short numerical example for the case in which the effort of learning is
neither low nor high, eq.(8), which is the only one whose outcome with respect to assimilation de-
pends on the existence or not of government policies to prevent nationalism. I assume f (c) = 0:55;
(1 α) f (P) = 1:5; f (K) = 0:2; f (X) = 0:6, for the case with (1 α) f (P)> f (X) and f (X) = 2, for
(1 α) f (P)< f (X), together with the initial conditions p0 = 0:1^q0 = 0:1 and p0 = 0:5^q0 = 0:5.
For the case without nationalism prevention, equations (3) and (4) become, respectively:
p˙ = (0:9 1:5q)p(1  p)
q˙ = ( 0:35+1:5p)q(1 q)
and p = 0:2333, q = 0:6. The vector field corresponding to such dynamics is:
[Figure 2 - see Appendix III]
From the vector field, clearly the Nash equilibrium is Liapunov stable (but not assymptotically stable
and, hence, not evolutionary stable under replicator dynamics). I use the following Liapunov func-
tion16 to proof this formally:
V (p;q) = 0:35ln p 1:15ln(1  p) 0:9lnq 0:6ln(1 q)
This function has a strict minimum at (p = 0:2333, q = 0:6) because:
16More precisely, a Liapunov function for the above system of ODE is V (p;q) V (p;q), but the use of V (p;q) instead
does not affect the proof. The only difference is that V (p;q) V (p;q) = 0 and is a strict minimum at (p = 0:2333;q =
0:6), while V (p;q) is also a strict minimum but is different from zero at (p;q). To find this Liapunov function, I employed
separation of variables in a procedure similar to the one in section 11.2 of Hirsch, Smale and Devaney (2004) for the
Lotka-Volterra system. Many books present a formal definition of Liapunov stability, but one I found particularly nice
can be seen in the same book on pages 194-195.
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∂V (p;q)
∂ p =
 0:35
p +
1:15
1 p = 0) p = p
∂V (p;q)
∂q =
 0:9
q +
0:6
1 q = 0) q = q
and
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂ p2 =
0:35
p2 +
1:15
(1 p)2 > 0;8p
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂ p2
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂q2 = (
0:35
p2 +
1:15
(1 p)2 )(
0:9
q2 +
0:6
(1 q)2 )> 0;8p;8q
Let B be an open ball about (p;q) in the plane. For neutral stability of (p;q), all we require is
dV (p;q)
dt = 0 for all (p;q) 2 B:
dV (p;q)
dt = (
 0:35
p +
1:15
1 p)(0:9 1:5q)p(1  p)+(
 0:9
q +
0:6
1 q)( 0:35+1:5p)q(1 q)
) dV (p;q)dt = 0;8p;8q 2 B
When policies to prevent nationalism are available, equations (3) and (4) become, respectively:
p˙ = ( 0:5 1:5q)p(1  p)
q˙ = ( 0:35+1:5p)q(1 q)
and the corresponding vector field is:
[Figure 3 - see Appendix III]
For both systems of non-linear differential equations, the solutions were obtained numerically in
MATLAB using the classic fourth order four-stage Runge-Kutta method (see Appendix II) using a
constant step size equal to ∆t = 0:02. The solution paths are presented in figure 4, in which the
state space is presented by the unit square. I present two orbits for the free nationalism case for
the initial conditions p0 = 0:1^ q0 = 0:1 and p0 = 0:5^ q0 = 0:5. In the figure, it can be seen the
points corresponding to these sets of initial conditions as well as the center of the orbits, which is
the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies but not an evolutionary equilibrium. The figure also shows
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the trajectory corresponding to the case with nationalism prevention corresponding to the latter set
of initial conditions as well as the state θEE = (0;0). I also present a table with some values for p
and q along the trajectories, obtained from the Runge-Kutta algorithm:
[Figure 4 - see Appendix III]
[Table 4 - see Appendix III]
From the table, we can see the oscillatory polymorphic pattern of both nationals and immigrants for
the nationalism-free case. Both start with a very small proportion of nationalists and learners among
their respective populations (10% each). Then, nationalists rise quickly (after 300 steps, they reached
82%), creating an incentive for the growth of learners among the immigrants’ population. At step
500, learners achieved 96%, almost the totallity of the immigrants, and this led to a sharp reduction
in nationalistic behaviour among the population of nationals. Nationalists achieved a level as low
as 1:5% at step 900, leading then to a subsequent sharp reduction of learners over time and to the
re-start of the cycle.
For the case when nationalism is prevented, we can clearly see the number of nationalists drops
very quickly, becoming already residual at step 200. This fall leads to the drop in the proportion of
learners over time, converging both populations to monomorphic states with 100% of welcome-types
and non-learners.
3.2 Influence of enclaves
I start this section presenting an example for the case in which nationalism is prevented and all six
possible stationary states exist. For this, I select f (c) = 0:12; (1 α) f (P) = 0:05; f (K) = 0:2;
f (X) = 0:1, ρ = 1, γ = 0:2 and β = 0:85. For these values of the parameters, the equations govern-
ing the system dynamics are:
p˙ = ( 0:05 0:05q)p(1  p)
q˙ = (0:04+0:05p 0:13q)q(1 q)
The six stationary points are the four corners of the square plus (p2 = 0;q2 = 0:308) and (p3 =
1;q3 = 0:692). The vector field in the figure below clearly shows that the corners correspond-
ing to p = 1 are unstable nodes, the points (1;0:692), (0;0) and (0;1) are saddle points and the
only attractor is indeed the stable node (0;0:308), which was the expected outcome given 0:03 =
f (K)(1 ρβ )< f (c)< f (K)(1 ργ) = 0:16.
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[Figure 5 - see Appendix III]
Now, I present a numerical simulation for all five possible cases presented in table 3 (free na-
tionalism and enclaves). I used (1 α) f (P) = 0:1; f (K) = 0:2; f (X) = 0:08, ρ = 1, γ = 0:2 and
β = 0:85. The corresponding equation governing the share of nationalists among the population of
nationals is:
p˙ = (0:02 0:1q)p(1  p)
The equation governing the share of learners has the form:
q˙ = ((0:16  f (c))+0:1p 0:13q)q(1 q)
I used the following values for f (c) in the simulations carried: 0:020; 0:100; 0:145; 0:200;
0:235; 0:400 and the corresponding evolutionary equilibria were, respectively, θEE = (0;1), corner;
θEE = (0;0:462), edge of the square with an isomorphic population of welcome-type nationals and
a polymorphic population of immigrants; θEE = (0:11;0:2), center, with both populations evolving
to a polymorphic equilibrium; θEE = (0:66;0:2), same case as the previous one; θEE = (1;0:192),
edge of the square with an isomorphic population of nationalists and a polymorphic population of
immigrants; θEE = (1;0), corner.
The following two figures present the solution paths and the corresponding vector fields leading
to each of the above evolutionary equilibria for different sets of initial conditions. As in section 3.1,
the solution paths were obtained using the Runge-Kutta algorithm and the simulations were carried
in MATLAB. For the case with f (c) = 0:145, it can be seen that all seven possible stationary points
are present in the state space although only the stable focus is an evolutionary equilibrium:
[Figure 6 - see Appendix III]
[Figure 7 - see Appendix III]
4 Further Research
The framework presented in this paper suggests several directions for future research. In this section,
I start exploring briefly two possibilities which are the existence of integration policies by the gov-
ernment and the endogeneization of the government role according to which nationalism prevention
24
or not would depend endogenously on the proportion of nationalists in the population of nationals
given that the national citizens would be the ones electing the government.
With respect to the first possibility, I relax the assumption that only nationals can work in the
public services. I assume the host country government has some policy according to which addi-
tional working posts are created in the public sector in order to be filled by assimilated immigrants.
That means some learners may now achieve complete integration into the national collective. Notice
that, differently from affirmative policies such as the one implemented in South Africa after the end
of apartheid, my framework assumes a policy of quotas which is very pro-immigration once I assume
immigrants do not steal any jobs from the already employed nationals, i.e., the public employment
level is simply raised through public expenditure and the new posts are destinated to assimilated non-
national individuals. I assume there is a proportionΠ of integrated (hired) learners. Hence, whenever
an immigrant looks for a public service, she has a probability of meeting with a non-national em-
ployee given by:
ΠxtL
ΠxtL+x
t
N+x
t
W
where xti is the number of individuals of i-type at time t (N = nationalists, W = welcome and L =
learners). With respect to the original payoffs in section 2.1, now, when a learner seeking for a ser-
vice meets a learner-type employee, the only change is that she does not feel discriminated (same
payoff as when meeting with a welcome-type national):
um(L;L) = f (P;K)  f (c)
Also, when a non-learner seeks for a service and meets a learner-type employee, she gets the com-
plete service, does not feel discriminated and gets β f (K) [this last term is the same corresponding
to the utility gain whenever this pairwise meeting happens in the enclaves case, see section 2.2]:
um(H;L) = f (P)+β f (K)
In summary, whenever an immigrant seeks for a public service, she faces the following game:
 N W L
L 0;0 m1;n2 0;0
H m2;n1 0;0 m0;0
!
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where m0 = um(H;L) um(L;L) = f (c)  (1 β ) f (K). The corresponding probabilities of a given
type of player being called at time t to play the above stage game are given below:
0
B@
xtN
ΠxtL+x
t
N+x
t
W
xtW
ΠxtL+x
t
N+x
t
W
ΠxtL
ΠxtL+x
t
N+x
t
W
xtL
xtL+x
t
H
0;0 m1;n2 0;0
xtH
xtL+x
t
H
m2;n1 0;0 m0;0
1
CA
The new system of ordinary differencial equations would be then derived from the above payoff
matrix but now, differently from sections 2.1 and 2.2, the probabilites of who an immigrant will face
at the public services office depends on both populations making the derivation of the system more
complicated.
With respect to the second idea for future research, I assume that the parameter α accounting
for how accessible the public services are to non-learners would be endogenous. The parameter
would depend on the ideology of the elected government, which would depend on the proportion
of nationalists in the population. The idea of government here would be associated with a bi-party
parliament where the proportions of nationalist and welcome-type deputies would be identical to
the ones present in the population of nationals. Hence, a population of nationals composed only
by nationalists would elect a 100% nationalist parliament so that α = 0. On the other extreme,
when nationalism becomes extinct, the parliament would be completely composed by welcome-type
deputies and α = 1. A possible way of trying to make α endogenous would be to assume α = 1  p
and (1 α) = p in the utility functions of sections 2.1 and 2.2. The analysis of the new non-linear
system would be in principle more complicated than the ones presented in this paper.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed the evolutionary pattern over generations of the behaviours of immigrants
and nationals living in a country where both cultural barriers and nationalism co-exist. At the initial
conditions of the model, both populations are necessarily polymorphic and an immigrant may be
either a learner or a non-learner while nationals may welcome immigrants or adopt nationalistic
attitudes against them. I also took into account the role of the government in preventing or not these
nationalistic behaviours as well as the effect of the existence of an immigrants’ enclave in the host
country.
Two central ideas in the paper are the use of language learning as a proxy for cultural assimilation
and that immigrants have to meet nationals whenever the individuals in the former group look for
public services, in which employment is restricted to national citizens. The dynamics of the evolution
process was modelled using replicator dynamics, initially without own population effects and then
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extending the differential equation related to the immigrants’ dynamics in order to take into account
the own population effects derived from the interactions among the latter group taking place in the
enclave.
When there is no enclave, the dynamical analysis of the system of ordinary differential equations
showed that, independently of the existence or not of free nationalism, a monomorphic population of
learner immigrants together with the extinction of nationalism is an evolutionary equilibrium (EE)
for a low cost of learning the host country language. This outcome can be seen in Latin American
countries such as Brazil where a large amount of Portuguese, Spanish and Italian speakers arrived
during the 20th century becoming completely assimilated without the appearance of enclaves or na-
tionalism. On the other hand, when the effort for becoming assimilated is high, multiculturalism is
always an EE because immigrants evolve to a monomorphic population in which learners become
extinct over time. But in this case, the pattern of multiculturalism is directly linked to the government
policy given that nationalism prevention brings nationalism to extinction while free nationalism leads
to the extinction of any national citizen welcoming immigrants. The former pattern of multicultur-
alism is more likely to be seen in the UK, Australia, Sweden and Canada while the latter resembles
the former colonies in Africa and Asia during the last century and also some former Soviet republics
such as Latvia and Estonia.
More interesting is the case when the effort of learning falls in an intermediate level and nation-
alism is not prevented. In this case, no EE exists at all and the dynamics is very similar to the Lotka-
Volterra predator-prey model for competition between two animal species with no-overcrowding.
Over generations, both populations of immigrants and nationals continue to be polymorphic in such
way that the shares of their sub-populations keep changing over time. In the state space, a com-
plete evolutionary cycle is charactetized by a closed orbit about the Nash equilibrium, departing and
always re-starting at the initial conditions.
The existence of an enclave in the host country makes meetings among immigrants more likely to
occur. In such a context, non-learners would be able to obtain an extra-utility due to the acquisition
of information from leaner immigrants about the host country society, places and daily environment
given their lack of knowledge of the local language prevents them from doing this. In line with the
empirical literature on migration, comparing the case of host countries with and without an enclave,
the upper boundary of the cost of learning still leading to the complete assimilation of immigrants
over time is lower in the former case. Complete assimilation now requires individuals with lower
switching language costs.
In extreme cases when an enclave is more likely a ghetto, that is, the likelihood of meetings
among immigrants is one and the extra utility gain to non-learners approaches the utility level learn-
ers are able to get themselves from interacting with the environment, complete assimilation of immi-
grants cannot be an EE. Part of the learners become extinct over time when there is free nationalism
while under nationalism prevention, no assimilation at all takes place. These latter results are linked
with another difference in the evolutionary pattern when an enclave exists. Differently from the case
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without enclaves, we may have EEs characterized by polymorphism in both populations for free na-
tionalism and polymorphism in the population of immigrants when nationalism is prevented. Finally,
in all cases studied in the paper, no multiple EE exists, although there are always multiple stationary
points at the boundary and, in some cases, in the interior of the state space.
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Appendix I
In this appendix, I analyze the derivation and the stability at the five stationary points of the non-
linear system of ordinary differential equations composed of equations (1) and (2). Assume at the
beginning of the time frame, there are two very large populations, one of nationals and the other of
immigrants, both of size xt , such that:
xt = xtN + x
t
W
xt = xtL + x
t
H
Where the subscripts N, W , L and H account respectively for the sizes of the sub-populations
of nationalist, welcome, learner and non-learner types. Assume n contests (stage-games) take place
during the time interval ε such that the proportion of players from each population taking part in
the contests equals ε = n=xt . Assume also that pt = xtN=x
t and qt = xtL=x
t are the proportions of
nationalists and learners, respectively, at time zero. Relying on the law of large numbers and, based
on the stage-game payoff matrix of section 2.1 which is repeated below:
 L H
N 0;0 n1;m2
W n2;m1 0;0
!
In one given contest, the expected payoff accruing to the sub-population of nationalists is given
by:17
pt(1 qt)n1
And in n contests:
npt(1 qt)n1
17Originally, in biology, the outcome of each stage-game defines the number of offspring produced by an animal adopt-
ing behaviour x-type when contesting with another animal adopting behaviour y-type. Animals only produce offspring
after taking part in the contests during which they may escalate and fight (or simply refrain from fighting) for nesting
sites. A good nesting site may require fighting for it depending on the opponent. Some authors also assume that the
animals contesting and giving birth die after the process and are therefore not restored back to the original population
[see Weibull (1997) and Miekisz, J. (undated)]. Others do not assume the animals die and they are replaced back to the
population together with their offspring [see Gintis (2000)]. The dynamics does not change using either approaches. In
the approach presented in this appendix, I assume that individuals taking part in the contests (stage-games) are restored
back to the population after the pairwise meeting.
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Hence, the subpopulation of nationalists at time t + ε is:
xt+εN = x
t
N +np
t(1 qt)n1 ) xt+εN = x
t
N + εx
t
N(1 q
t)n1
Using the same reasoning, the subpopulation of welcome-type nationals at time t + ε is:
xt+εW = x
t
W +n(1  p
t)qtn2
Such that the population of nationals at time t + ε is:
xt+ε = xtN + x
t
W +np
t(1 qt)n1 +n(1  pt)qtn2
) xt+ε = xt + εxt pt(1 qt)n1 + εxt(1  pt)qtn2
Based on the above equations, the proportion of nationalists at time t + ε , pt+ε , becomes:
pt+ε = x
t+ε
N
xt+ε =
xtN+εx
t
N(1 q
t)n1
xt+εxt pt(1 qt)n1+εxt(1 pt)qtn2
And the change in the proportion p from time t to time t + ε is:
pt+ε   pt = p
tε[(1 qt)(1 pt)n1 (1 pt)qtn2]
1+ε pt(1 qt)n1+ε(1 pt)qtn2
Dividing both sides by ε and taking the limit of ε ! 0, gives equation (1):
p˙ = (n1(1 q) n2q)p(1  p)
Using the population of immigrants, the same type of reasoning can be used to derive equation
(2). Now, turning to the stability analysis, the Jacobian matrix at a given stationary point (p;q) in the
interior or boundary of the square [0;1]2 is:
Ω(p;q) =
0
@ ∂F1(p;q)∂ p ∂F1(p;q)∂q
∂F2(p;q)
∂ p
∂F2(p;q)
∂q
1
A
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Analyzing the stability at each stationary point presented in proposition 1:
At point (0;0): tr[Ω(0;0)] = n1 +m1; det[Ω(0;0)] = n1m1. For stability, requires: m1 < 0 )
f (c) > f (K) and n1 < 0 ) (1 α) f (P) < f (X), i.e., nationalism prevented as in proposition 5.
At point (1;1): tr[Ω(1;1)] = n2 + m2; det[Ω(1;1)] = n2m2. For stability, requires: n2 < 0 )
f (X) < 0, which is never satisfied, hence, never an EE. At point (1;0): tr[Ω(1;0)] =  n1 m2;
det[Ω(1;0)] = n1m2. For stability, requires: n1 > 0) (1 α) f (P)> f (X), i.e., free nationalism and
m2 > 0) f (c) > (1 α) f (P)+ f (K) as in proposition 3. At point (0;1): tr[Ω(0;1)] =  n2 m1;
det[Ω(0;1)] = n2m1. For stability, requires: n2 > 0, i.e., either free or prevented nationalism and
m1 > 0) f (c)< f (K), such as in propositions 2 and 5.
At point (p;q): tr[Ω(p;q)] = 0; det[Ω(p;q)] =  (p  p2)(q q2)(n1 +n2)(m1 +m2) > 0. The
dynamical system is non-hyperbolic at this stationary point given the eigenvalues (pure imaginary)
have zero real part. I can only conclude from the nullclines in the squared state space that the vector
field winds in the counter-clockwise direction about the stationary point. But I can not use lineariza-
tion to identify the stability of the system at this stationary point. For this, I employ the following
Liapunov function:
V (p;q) = m1 ln p+m2 ln(1  p) n1 lnq n2 ln(1 q)  c such that V (p;q) = 0
Proposition: V (p;q) is a non-strict Liapunov function for (p;q) and (p;q) is Liapunov stable
but not asymptotically stable.
Proof: V (p;q) has a strict minimum at (p;q):
∂V (p;q)
∂ p =
m1
p  
m2
1 p = 0) p = p
∂V (p;q)
∂q =
 n1
q +
n2
1 q = 0) q = q
2nd order conditions of the Hessian at (p;q):
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂ p2 =
 m1
p2 +
 m2
(1 p)2 > 0
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂ p2
∂ 2V (p;q)
∂q2 = (
 m1
p2 +
 m2
(1 p)2 )(
n1
q2 +
n2
(1 q)2 )> 0
Hence, V (p;q) = 0^V (p;q)> 0, (p;q) 6= (p;q).
Let B be an open ball about (p;q) in the plane. For neutral stability of (p;q), all we require is
dV (p;q)
dt  0 for all (p;q) 2 fB  (p;q)g and
dV (p;q)
dt = 0 for (p;q):
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dV (p;q)
dt =
m1(1 p) m2 p
p(1 p) [n1(1 q) n2q]p(1  p)+
 n1(1 q)+n2q
q(1 q) [m1(1  p) m2 p]q(1 q) = 0;
8p;8q 2 B
Hence, V (p;q) is indeed a non-strict Liapunov function for (p;q); (p;q) is Liapunov stable but
not asymptotically stable. Hence, (p;q) is a Nash equilibrium but not an EE.
Appendix II
In this appendix, I show the Runge-Kutta algorithm used to solve the two systems of ODE in section
3.1. For the step from tn to tn+1, we have:
 
pn+1
qn+1
!
=
 
pn
qn
!
+h6 
 
pn1 +2  pn2 +2  pn3 + pn4
qn1 +2 qn2 +2 qn3 +qn4
!
where h = tn+1  tn = ∆t and:
pn1 =
∂ p
∂ t (pn;qn) qn1 =
∂q
∂ t (pn;qn)
pn2 =
∂ p
∂ t (pn +(h=2)  pn1;qn +(h=2) qn1) qn2 =
∂q
∂ t (pn +(h=2)  pn1;qn +(h=2) qn1)
pn3 =
∂ p
∂ t (pn +(h=2)  pn2;qn +(h=2) qn2) qn3 =
∂q
∂ t (pn +(h=2)  pn2;qn +(h=2) qn2)
pn4 =
∂ p
∂ t (pn +h  pn3;qn +h qn3) qn4 =
∂q
∂ t (pn +h  pn3;qn +h qn3)
For the nationalism-free case, the number of iteractions until one orbit was completed equalled 1600
and 1125 steps for initial conditions p = 0:1; q = 0:1 and p = 0:5; q = 0:5, respectively. For the case
when nationalism is officialy prevented, the number of steps equalled 1103 until the evolutionary
equilibrium was achieved.
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Appendix III - Tables and Figures
Case Value of f (c) Equilibrium
A [0; f (K)(1 ρβ )  ε] (0;1)
B [ f (K)(1 ρβ )+ ε; f (K)(1 ργ)  ε] (0;q2)
C [ f (K)(1 ργ)+ ε;+∞) (0;0)
Table 1: Possible evolutionary equilibria given the cost of learning the language (nationalism pre-
vented and presence of enclaves).
Case with f (K)< (1 α) f (P)=(ρ(β   γ))
Value of f (c)18 Equilibrium Stationary points
[0;A) (0;1) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1)
(A;B) (0;q2) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (0;q2)
(B;C) (0;0) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1)
(C;D) (0;0) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (1;q3)
(D;+∞) (0;0) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1)
Case with f (K)> (1 α) f (P)=(ρ(β   γ))
Value of f (c) Equilibrium Stationary points
[0;A) (0;1) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1)
(A;C) (0;q2) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (0;q2)
(C;B) (0;q2) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (0;q2); (1;q3)
(B;D) (0;0) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (1;q3)
(D;+∞) (0;0) (0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1)
Table 2: Possible equilibria and stationary points for the case of enclaves together with nationalism
prevention.
18Where A = f (K)(1 ρβ ); B = f (K)(1 ργ); C = (1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ρβ ); D = (1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ).
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Value of f (c) Equil.
[0; f (K)(1 ρβ )  ε] (0;1)
[ f (K)(1 ρβ ); f (K)(1 ργ(1 q1) ρβq1)  ε] (0;q2)
[ f (K)(1 ργ(1 q1) ρβq1);(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ(1 q1) ρβq1)] (p1;q1)
[(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ(1 q1) ρβq1)+ ε;(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ)] (1;q3)
[(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ)+ ε;+∞) (1;0)
Table 3: Possible evolutionary equilibria given the cost of learning the host country language (free
nationalism and presence of enclaves).
Free nationalism Nationalism prevented
Nationalists Learners Nationalists Learners
initial conditions 10.00% 10.00% 50.00% 50.00%
step 100 33.86% 9.17% 6.98% 50.50%
step 200 67.95% 19.06% 0.75% 35.48%
step 300 82.02% 54.10% 0.12% 21.62%
step 400 75.70% 86.68% 0.03% 12.06%
step 500 54.05% 95.89% 0.01% 6.38%
step 600 27.96% 97.51% 0.00% 3.27%
step 700 11.21% 97.15% 0.00% 1.65%
step 800 4.06% 95.43% 0.00% 0.83%
step 900 1.51% 91.80% 0.00% 0.41%
step 1000 0.64% 85.15% 0.00% 0.21%
step 1200 0.29% 59.13% ***** *****
step 1600 9.96% 10.01% ***** *****
Table 4: Proportion of Nationalists and Learners along the solution trajectories.
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Figure 1: Stationary points present in the state space according to the cost of learning, where 1L=
f (K)(1  γρ(1  q1) ρβq1); 1U= f (K)(1  γρ(1  q1) ρβq1)+ (1 α) f (P); 2L= f (K)(1 
ρβ ); 2U= f (K)(1 ργ); 3L=(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ρβ ); 3U=(1 α) f (P)+ f (K)(1 ργ).
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Figure 2: Vector field for countries where host language is neither close nor far from the origin
country one and nationalism can not be prevented.
Figure 3: Vector field for countries where there exist measures preventing nationalism and the cost
of learning is neither low nor high.
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Figure 4: Trajectories for both cases of nationalism-prevention policies and free nationalism.
Figure 5: Vector field when nationalism is prevented and an enclave exists - case with six stationary
points.
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Figure 6: From top left to bottom right, vector fields for f (c) = 0:020; 0:100; 0:145; 0:200; 0:235
and 0:400 39
Figure 7: From top left to bottom right, solution paths for f (c) = 0:020; 0:100; 0:145; 0:200; 0:235;
0:400 and different sets of initial conditions.
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